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I.
A.

REBUTTAL ARGUMENT

Introduction.

In Respondent's Brief, the State's essential position is that the Edens were to blame for
the disallowal in default of their Water Right No. 37-864. The State takes this "blame the victim"
approach notwithstanding that, based on uncontroverted facts, the Idaho Department of Water
Resources ("IDWR") committed no less than four material statutory/due process errors in their
handling of the Edens' claim for Water Right No. 37-864:
1.
IDWR used an incorrect mailing address to provide the
Edens claim information, although IDWR had just received
the Edens' written confirmation of their correct mailing
address.

2.
In violation of Idaho Code§ 42-1408(5), IDWR filed a
fatally defective affidavit for proof of service of the Second
Round Service Notice.
3.
In violation ofl.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to serve
the Edens personally with a Three-Day Notice of Intent to
Take Default, prior to seeking the disallowance of Water Right
No. 37-864 in default against them.
4.
Also in violation ofl.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to
provide the Court Clerk written certification of the name of
Edens and the address most likely to give the Edens notice of
default judgment with respect to Water Right No. 37-864.

Instead of acknowledging IDWR's errors, the State convinced the District Court to
disregard them and shift the blame to the Edens. Now the State also asks this Court to do the
same, to impose upon the Edens a permanent loss of their Water Right No. 37-864 resulting from
these IDWR oversights in the interest of "finality." Instead of acknowledging the IDWR errors
and the causative role of these oversights in the disallowance in default of 37-864, the State
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argues that the Edens "should have known" that their claim submitted to IDWR was not
satisfactory and that the Edens were unreasonable to believe they had done all they needed to do
1

to make a claim for 37-864. However, the law does not place the burden of divine inspiration,
or, even, innate knowledge, on water right claimants, as the State asserts: The Constitutions of
this Country and this State, along with State statutes and Court Rules, require that accurate,
complete and unambiguous notice is personally served prior to and after one of the most

1

The State makes this "should have known" argument even though, as the State also
acknowledges, there is no evidence in the record to support the District Court's finding that the
Edens had previous experience submitting an SRBA Claim for another water right.
At first, the State misleadingly suggests that the Edens had experience filing claims,
asserting: "Water right no. 37-864 was not the Edens only water interest in the Snake River
Basin. The Edens own at least one other water right that was properly claimed in the SRBA,
water right no. 37-10953. RR Vol. I, pp. 316-17. The Edens received a partial decree for water
right no. 37-10953 in 2002. R Vol. I, p. 709." Respondent's Brief at 9. Contrarily, the State also
admits, however, that the SRBA Claims for the other water rights held by the Edens, including
37-10953, were submitted by the Edens' predecessors: "This letter referred to 'Snake River
Basin Adjudication (SRBA) Notices of Claim to a Water Right #37-365, 37-366 and 37-367B
and Decrees #37-10322 and 10953.' R Vol. I, p. 214. IDWR's records indicate that notice of
claims were filed for the above water rights in the SRBA by the Edens' predecessors in interest
and ownership of those claims was transferred to the Edens. R Vol. I, pp. 308-319."
Respondent's Brief at 9, n. 10 (emphasis added).
The District Court apparently was misled on the issue of whether the Edens had
prior experience filing a claim for 37-10953 as the Order Denying Motion to Set Aside,·
Order Denying Motion to File Late Claim at 9, n. 7, incorrectly finds: "The Movants
previously filed a claim in the SRBA for water right 37-10953, which was ultimately
decreed in 2002 ... .'' R Vol. I, p. 379, fn. 7. Actually, as the State admits, a 2002 IDWR
printout in the record reflects that this claim for 37-10953 was submitted by the Edens'
predecessors in 1988, not by the Edens who succeeded to ownership after claim
submission. R Vol. I, p. 334, n. 1. Perhaps, if the District Court had not been under the
mistaken impression that the Edens had prior experience filing a claim for water right
37-10953, the District Court would have been more understanding of the Edens' attempt
to file a claim for water right 37-864. In any event, to find that the Edens had previously
submitted a claim for a water right in the SRBA is not supported by the court record and
is, in fact, controverted by admissions in Respondent's Brief
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important property rights a person can hold in Idaho, a water right, is taken by default. Finality

above all else, as the State seeks, would be the symptom of an unjust legal system; Finality with
fairness is what the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions, and applicable statutes and Court Rules,
provide for here.
The circumstances of this case are clearly unique. None of the cases cited by the State
involved circumstances where the water user submitted documents to IDWR in an attempt to file
a claim for a water right or where IDWR committed errors in the handling of the claim of a water
user or where the SRBA Court made a clearly erroneous finding of fact that the Second Round

Service Notice had been served. The constellation of uncontroverted IDWR oversights leading
to an improper default judgment for 37-864 being taken against the Edens, any one of these
errors being material and sufficient for relief, should be properly remedied, rather than ignored:
1.

IDWR used an incorrect mailing address to provide the Edens claim
information, although IDWR had just received the Edens' written
confirmation of their correct mailing address.

IDWR received the Edens' confirmation of their correct mailing address together with
enclosures attempting to claim 37-864, but then mis-addressed the May 19, 2005, follow up
letter with the claim form and further information required to complete the Edens' claim for
37-864. R Vol. I, pp. 214,229. The Edens never received this IDWR follow up letter and did
not know that IDWR had rejected their claim to 3 7-864 and that they had more to do to make a
valid claim to protect their water right. Affidavit of Gary Eden, R Vol. I, p. 231, 13; Affidavit of

Glenna Eden, R Vol. I, pp. 238-39, 13. This is a material error by IDWR because it resulted in
the Edens not receiving vital information for filing a claim for water right 3 7-864 . The Edens
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have established that they would have submitted a claim in compliance with the terms of the
May 19, 2005, letter if they had received it. R Vol. I, p. 231, if3; pp. 238-39, 13.
It is undisputed that at the time of the May 19, 2005, IDWR letter, IDWR had the correct
mailing address for the Edens, having recently received their written address confirmation.

R Vol. I, pp. 214,229. The misaddressed May 19, 2005, IDWR letter effectively rejected the
Edens' attempted claim for 37-864 and enclosed a claim form, claim form instructions and other
information that the Edens needed to have in order to comply with the requirements for filing a
claim. R Vol. I, p. 229. Without receiving this misaddressed letter, the Edens were not informed
the claim they had submitted to IDWR was not adequate and effectively were denied the IDWR
claim filing assistance the purported Second Round Service Notice promises. To make matters
worse, IDWR and the State have failed to produce for the record, the claim documents submitted
by the Edens so there is no way for Edens to prove what they submitted and no way for the Court
to confirm whether IDWR correctly refused to accept these dociments as a claim. IDWR
expressly acknowledged that it received "enclosures" from the Edens and that these enclosed
documents were sufficient for the IDWR to conclude that the Edens "would like to file a claim
on 37-864." R Vol. I, p. 229. Yet, for unconfirmed reasons, IDWR refused to treat these
documents as an actual claim. Id.

2.

In violation of Idaho Code§ 42-1408(5), IDWR filed with the SRBA Court, a
fatally defective affidavit for proof of service of the Second Round Service
Notice.

The SRBA Court, in its decision below, erroneously relied upon the defective Affidavit of

Danni M Smith Re: Second Round Service of Commencement Notice for Basin 37, Part 1
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("Smith Affidavit") in making the finding of fact that the SRBA Court record established that the
statutorily required Second Round Service Notice had been validly served on the Edens. R Vol. I,
pp. 377-78, n.3, p. 380.
Idaho Code § 42-1408(4) provides for a second round of service of notice of the order
commencing a general water rights adjudication ("Second Round Service Notice") to the record
owners of land associated with unclaimed water rights, in an attempt to ensure that these
property owners are aware of the need to claim their water rights:
Upon expiration of the period for filing notices of claims, the
[IDWR] director shall conduct a second round of service in
conformance with this subsection. The director shall compare the
notices of claims with department records and other information
reasonably available to determine whether there are any rights to
water from the water system for which no notice of claim was
filed. In the event the director determines that not all claimants
have filed claims, the director shall make a reasonably diligent
effort in accordance with the court order to determine the land to
which the possible claim is appurtenant, the last known owner of
that land, and the last known address of that owner. The director
shall prepare a second round notice of order. The director shall
serve this notice on the last known owner .... The notice shall
contain the information specified in subsection (1) of this
section ....
The Edens, as the record owners of the 40 acres associated with previously decreed but
unclaimed Water Right No. 37-864, were entitled to personal service of such Second Round

Service Notice. R Vol. I, pp. 254-58.
Idaho Code § 42-1408(5) further provides that "[t]he director shall file with the district
court such proof of service as may be required to demonstrate compliance with the above
requirements." In this case, the IDWR director apparently filed the Smith Affidavit with the
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SRBA Court in 2005 in an attempt to comply with Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4)&(5). See R Vol. I,
pp. 924-932. The failure ofIDWR to include a copy of the Second Round Service Notice with the
Smith Affidavit, although it was referenced as Exhibit A, is a material error because without
Exhibit A, the Smith Affidavit does not establish what was served and, whether, what was served
substantively complied with statutory and due process requirements. Id Further, the Smith
Affidavit's failure to have a properly marked mailing list marked as Exhibit B, also raises
questions about who actually was served. Id Thus, the Smith Affidavit does not definitively
establish either what was served or who was served. Nevertheless, the District Court relied upon
this defective affidavit filed by IDWR to make a finding in the Order Denying 1\l!otion to Set
Aside; Order Denying Late Claim ("Order Denying Motions") that the Edens had been properly
served with the statutorily required Second Round Service Notice. R Vol. I, pp. 377-78, n.3. This
finding is clearly erroneous because the Smith Affidavit is fatally defective and does not support
the District Court's finding. This clearly erroneous finding alone justifies vacating the Order
Denying Motions and setting aside the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right
No. 37-864.
It is well established that the appellate function of the Supreme Court is to ascertain
whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions oflaw. Owen v. Boydstun, 101 Idaho 31,624 P.2d 413 (1981). Even where the
evidence is entirely in written form, the standard of review of a district court's findings of fact is
whether they are clearly erroneous. Deer Creek, Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc.,
107 Idaho 286,688 P.2d 1191 (Ct. App. 1984). Where the trial court's findings of fact are clearly
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erroneous and against the weight of the evidence, those findings will be set aside on appeal. State
ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distrib., Inc., 101 Idaho 447,453,615 P.2d 116, 122 (1980). Based on

these legal authorities and the absence of evidence in the record for the lower court's finding of
fact regarding second round service, the Order Denying Motions, the Order Closing Claims
Taking Basins OJ, 02, 03, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 45, 47, and 63, and Disallowal of Unclaimed
Water Rights ("Disallowal Order") and the Final Unified Decree should be set aside with

respect to Water Right No. 37-864.
3.

In violation of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to serve the Edens personally
with a Three-Day Notice of Intent to Take Default, prior to seeking the
disallowance of Water Right No. 37-864 in default against them.

IDWR's failure to personally serve the Edens with the required I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) notice
of intent to take default, resulted in judgment of disallowance of Water Right No. 37-864 being
taken in default against the Edens without their knowledge. Disallowal Order; Final Unified
Decree,· R Vol. I, pp. 110-205 at 150; pp. 933-1140 at 956.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), in effect in 2013 and 2014 when the decrees of
disallowal of 37-864 were entered in default (Disallowal Order and Final Un(fied Decree),
required that notice of intent to seek default be served three days prior upon a party who has
appeared personally or by a representative. I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)(2004) (copy included in Addenda
to Appellants' Brief). The "appearance" required to trigger the three-day notice requirement of
this Rule has been broadly defined, and is not limited to a formal court appearance. Conduct
which indicates an intent to defend, such as the Edens' attempted claim for 37-864, can
constitute an appearance within the meaning of the Rule. Newbold v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663,
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666, 672 P .2d 231, 234 (1983). The failure to comply with the notice of intent to seek default
requirement of Rule 55 justifies setting aside the default judgment that is entered against such
party where a meritorious defense is shown. Id The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and
specifically Rule 55, have been determined to apply to SRBA proceedings. See In re SRBA Case
No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246,258, 912 P.2d 614, 626 (1995), discussed further below. Thus, the

Edens, who had attempted to claim 37-864 and whose mailing address was. known, should have
received this notice prior to default being entered. But, alas, such Rule 55(b )(2) notice of intent
never was sent to them.
IDWR and the State failed to provide the Edens this three-day notice both times (in 2013
and 2014) they sought and obtained by default the decree of the District Court disallowing Water
Right No. 37-864 because it was unclaimed. As discussed further below, the District Court
erroneously found and concluded that a decree of water right disallowance is not a judgment,
that the authority for the entry of a decree of disallowance is governed by statutes, rather than by
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and that compliance with Rule 55(b) is not required when a
default judgment disallowing unclaimed water rights is entered by the SRBA Court. Order
Denying Motions at 3-4, n.3, R Vol. I, pp. 377-78, n. 3 .

.The failure of IDWR and the State to serve this three-day notice obviously is material
because if such notice of intent to take default had been served on the Edens, they would have
responded to the notice and taken action to protect their interest in water right 37-864. See
R Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. Because they did not receive such notice or any other communication
on the matter, they relied upon their prior submission to IDWR and did nothing further to protect
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their water right until they learned from the Watermaster that their water would not be delivered
as it had been in the past. R Vol. I, pp. 231, 356. This failure to comply with the three-day
notice requirement ofI.R.C.P. 55(b) justifies vacating the Order Denying Motions and setting
aside the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right 37-864.
4.

Also in violation of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2), IDWR failed to provide the Court
Clerk written certification of the name of Edens and the address most likely
to give the Edens notice of default judgment with respect to Water Right
No. 37-864, so the Clerk could give the Edens notice that judgment of
disallowance of 37-864 had been entered in default.

I.RC.P. 55(b), in effect at the time, also required the SRBA Court Clerk to be provided
written certification of the name of Edens and the address most likely to give them notice, so the
Clerk could give the Edens notice that judgment of disallowance of 37-864 had been entered in
default. However, neither the State nor IDWR, as applicants for default judgment, gave the
SRBA Court Clerk this information and, therefore, no such notice of default judgment was
provided to the Edens. This error is material because the failure to provide the Clerk with the
written certification of the name of Edens and their mailing address, information which IDWR
possessed, prevented the Clerk from providing the Edens notice that default judgment had been
entered for 37-864. Had the Edens received this notice, they could have and would have
immediately responded to that information and taken appropriate actions to protect their water
right from permanent loss. See Affidavit of Gary Eden, R Vol. I, p. 231, ,I3; Affidavit of Glenna
Eden, R Vol. I, pp. 238-39, ,I3. This failure to comply with the I.R.C.P. 55(b) post-judgment

notice requirement additionally justifies vacating the Order Denying Motions and setting aside
the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right No. 37-864.
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As discussed further below, under applicable legal authorities, any one of these four
material IDWR oversights is a sufficient basis for granting the Edens the relief they seek, while
the State's attempt to blame the Edens, in the interest of securing ultimate finality, does not
comport with applicable law and does not serve the interests of justice.

B.

The Partial Decree of Disallowal of Water Right No. 37-864, Entered in Default,
Should Be Set Aside under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), Because the Record Does Not Support
the District Court's Finding that the Statutorily Required Second Round Service
Notice Was Served on the Edens.
The State asserts that the Edens' argument regarding the defective Smith Affidavit was

not raised below and, therefore, is waived. Respondent's Brief at 15. Actually, applicable
authorities, including I.R.C.P. 52, do not support waiver in this instance, but, rather, allow for the
lower court's clearly erroneous finding based on the defective Smith Affidavit to be raised on
appeal.
The record before this Court unequivocally establishes that the Smith Affidavit, which the
District Court relied upon to support its finding that the Edens were served with the statutorily
required Second Round Service Notice, is incomplete and defective. See Order Denying Motions

at 6, R Vol. I, p. 380; Smith Affidavit, R Vol. I, pp. 924-32. The Smith Affidavit that was filed
by IDWR as proof of second round service is facially defective because it omits Exhibit A, the
copy of the Second Round Service Notice, and has no marked Exhibit B, the mailing list of
purported recipients of the Second Round Service Notice. Appellants' Brief at 17; Smith

Affidavit, R Vol. I, pp. 924-32. Therefore, the Smith Affidavit that IDWR filed with the SRBA
Court cannot, and does not, establish that the Edens were served with the Second Round Service

Notice. Thus, the finding of fact of the District Court that the Edens were properly served with
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the Second Round Service Notice is clearly unsupported by the record and is e1TOneous. The
Edens' argument is based on the discovery, after this Appeal was filed, when the Clerk's record
was prepared, that the Smith Affidavit in the SRBA Court record was defective. R Vol. I, p. 695.
The Edens then asserted in Appellants' Brief that the finding of fact made by the District Judge
that the Edens received second round service, as required by Idaho Code § 42-1408, was clearly
erroneous because it was based on the fatally defective Smith Affidavit filed by IDWR.

Appellants' Brief at 16-22.
The District Court's finding of fact that the Second Round Service Notice was served in
compliance with Idaho Code § 4 2-1408 is clearly erroneous for the fundamental reason it is not
supported by evidence "in the record." The essential appellate function of the Supreme Court is
to ascertain whether the evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusions of law. Owen v. Boydstun, IO 1 Idaho 31, 36, 624 P .2d 413, 418 ( 1981 ).
Considering the letter and spirit of I.R.C.P. 52, the Rule which concerns findings of facts and
conclusions of law, even where the evidence is entirely in written form, as here, the standard of
review of a district court's findings of fact is whether they are clearly erroneous. Deer Creek,

Inc. v. Clarendon Hot Springs Ranch, Inc., 107 Idaho 286,290, 688 P.2d 1191, 1196 (Ct. App.
1984) (citing Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321,658 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1983).
Where the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and against the weight of the
evidence, those findings will be set aside on appeal. State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distrib., Inc.,
l 01 Idaho 447, 453, 615 P.2d 116, 122 (1980) (citing Russ Ballard and Family Achievement

Institute v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 548 P.2d 72 (1976); I.R.C.P. 52(a)).
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The defects in the Smith Affidavit IDWR filed with the SRBA Court were not discovered
by the parties or the District Court until after the Order Denying Motions was issued by the
SRBA Court, this appeal was filed, and the Clerk's record was prepared and submitted to the
parties. Without knowledge of this error in the record, it was not possible for Appellants to raise
the issue before the District Court. LR.C.P. Rule 52(a)(l) apparently envisions that such defects
in the evidentiary record may be discovered at later stages: "A party may raise the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings whether or not the party raising the
question has made an objection to the findings or a motion to amend them or a motion for
judgment." Under Rule 52, the failure to raise the issue of the inadequacy of the affidavit to
support the findings of the District Court, does not bar a party from raising the issue on appeal.
Thus, the State's contention that the Edens' right to raise this issue on appeal was waived
because the Edens did not raise the issue before the District Court is not supported by
I.R.C.P. 52.
Moreover, the State's contention that the Edens waived the right to raise this issue on
appeal is not supported by case precedent, not even by those cases that are referred to by the
State. The State cites to Deiter v. Coons, 162 Idaho 44, 47,394 P.3d 87, 90 (2017) (quoting
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 207, 814 P.2d 917, 939 (1991)).
Deiter, Clements Farms and the other cases preceding Deiter, holding that a new theory cannot

be employed on appeal to attack a judgment, are clearly distinguishable and inapplicable to the
case at hand. None of these cases involved a situation where the district court made findings that
are clearly unsupported by the record or a situation where a party lacked knowledge of the
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defective court record, such as in this case. Deiter and the prior cases all involved situations
where a party had knowledge of all relevant facts and could have asserted the omitted legal
theories in the lower court. Moreover, none of these cases involved an appeal in which it was
asserted that the lower court committed clear error in its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
as is the case now before this Court.

Deiter v. Coons involved claims against a person who sold a steer for slaughter that was
later contaminated with E. coli bacteria by the slaughterer and also against persons to whom the
slaughterer delivered the carcass for processing into packages of meat. In their complaint, Deiter
alleged various theories of liability against the processors, but the only theory they presented to
the district court was that the processors were negligent per se based upon their violation of
various provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection Act On appeal, Deiter argued additional
theories that they contend would support a claim against the processor for negligence per se, but
the Supreme Court refused to consider them because they were not argued in the district court,
stating, "'An appellant is bound by the issues and theories upon which the case was tried below.
Although a judgment may be sustained upon any legal theory, a new theory cannot be employed
on appeal to attack the judgment.' Clements Farms, Inc., 120 Idaho at 207, 814 P.2d at 939."

Deiter, 162 Idaho at 53, 394 P.3d at 96 (2017).
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son involved claims alleging breach of implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose because a crop of beans, which had been planted with
seeds provided by Defendant, did not mature before the growing season ended. The trial court
found breach of an implied warranty of fitness, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The
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Supreme Court granted review of the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Before the Supreme
Court, the appellant tried to assert a new theory of damages which the Supreme Court refused to
consider because it had not been raised in the district court. The Court stated: "An appellant is
bound by the issues and theories upon which the case was tried below. Although a judgment may
be sustained upon any legal theory, a new theory cannot be employed on appeal to attack the
judgment. Beaupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 710 P.2d 520 (1985); Heckman Ranches, Inc. v.
State, 99 Idaho 793, 589 P.2d 540 (1979). Because the lost profits theory of damages was not

framed below, it is not properly before this Court on appeal. We will not pursue it further."
Clements, 120 Idaho at 207, 814 P .2d at 93 9.

Appellants have researched the line of cases preceding Deiter looking for any case that
might contain facts similar to the case at hand. Appellants found none. Appellants describe in the
Addendum hereto each of these cases going back to Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,393 P.2d 929
( 1962). These cases all involved situations where a party had knowledge of the relevant facts and
could have raised an issue or a theory in the lower court, but failed to do so and was denied the
right to do so for the first time on appeal. The case at hand is clearly distinguishable from the
cases discussed above and in the Addendum where a party was not allowed to present legal
theories on appeal which were available, but were not presented to the court below. None of
these cases involved the trial court committing clear error by entering findings of fact
unsupported by the evidence or the parties and the court discovering a defect in court records
after the preparation of the Clerk's record on appeal. The State's contention that the Edens
waived the right to challenge the clearly erroneous second round service finding of fact because
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they did not raise this issue before the District Court is not supported either by I.R.C.P. 52 or by
the case law.

C.

The Partial Decree of Disallowal, Entered in Default, Should Be Set Aside Under
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), Because the Edens Were Not Personally Served with the Required
Three-Days Notice of Intent to Take Default Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(b).
In its Response Brief, the State asserts that the District Court correctly concluded that due

process did not require that the Edens be personally served with three-days notice of the Closure

Order (herein "Disallowal Order"). Response Brief at 25-30. This assertion actually
misconstrues the allegation of Appellants with regard to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Rather than asserting
a due process violation here, Appellants raise the three-day notice requirement as a Rule 55(b)(2)
issue: "The District Court also should have set aside under LR.C.P. 60(b)(4) the Partial Decree
of Disallowal of Water Right No. 37-864 that was entered in default because the Edens were not
personally served with notice of the default, as was required by LR.C.P. 55(b)(2)." Appellants'

Brief at 23. The requirements of Rule 55(b)(2), in effect at the time the 2013 Dismissal Order
and the 2014 Final Unified Decree were entered in default with respect to 37-864, are the proper
focus here.
In the Order Denying Motions, the District Court ruled that "[t]he Movants are not
entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4) on the grounds that the Court failed to comply with Rule
55." Order Denying Motions at 6; R Vol. L p. 380. In support, the District Court held that "[t]he
disallowal of an unclaimed water right in a general adjudication is not a default judgment. Such a
disallowal is not entered pursuant to the procedures set forth in Rule 55. To the contrary, the
disallowal is entered pursuant to, and by operation of, statute. Idaho Code § 42-1420 provides
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that the failure to file a required notice of claim for a water right in a general adjudication will
result in that water right being lost. Idaho Code § 42-1420 .... Therefore, the Movants'
argument that Rule 55 is applicable to this Court's disallowal of an unclaimed water right is
unavailing." Id. In this manner, the District Court deprived the Edens of an important property
right without recognizing and providing them the procedural protections they are entitled to
receive under I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).
The decision of the District Court fails to recognize the difference between the
substantive law that governs the ownership of water rights and the procedural law that governs
the judicial process for granting or disallowing water rights. The substantive law is established
by the Idaho Legislature; but the procedural law is established by the Idaho Supreme Court. See
Const., Art. 5, Sec. 13; Idaho Code§§ 1-212 and -213. See also, Lawrence Warehouse Co. v.
Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389,397,405 P. 2d 634,638 (1965) ("Previously existing statutory
provisions governing issuance of injunctions, to the extent that they are purely procedural, and to
the extent that they are in conflict with applicable rules of IRCP, are of no further force or effect.
I.C. § 8-411 is a procedural statute. To the extent that its provisions may be in conflict with IRCP
rules 65(a) and 52(a), it is no longer in force or effect.")~ In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho
246,258, 912 P.2d 614,626 (1995). The Supreme Court's inherent authority to make rules
governing procedure and, by rule, to make inapplicable, procedural statutes which conflict with
procedural rules also was recognized in State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 58, 539 P.2d 604,610
(1975):
While the legislature has authorized this Court to formulate rules
of procedure, this Court has the inherent authority, made especially
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clear by the amended provisions of Article V, Section 2, of the
Idaho Constitution, to make rules governing procedure in the lower
courts of this state. R. E. W. Construction Co. v. District Court of
the Third Judicial District. The legislature need not repeal statutes
made unnecessary by, or found in conflict with, court
reorganization and integration. It is well settled in this state, as part
of the rule-making power possessed by this Court, that the Court
may by rule, as in the case of Rule 27 of the Rules of Court for the
Magistrate's Division of the District Court and District Court,
make inapplicable procedural statutes which conflict with our
present court system.
The concepts which distinguish between the power of the Legislature to enact laws that
govern substantive rights to own water and the power of the judicial branch to make rules that
govern the court procedures by which those rights are judicially regulated was recognized and
applied in In Re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 912 P.2d 614 (1995). That case resolved
issues relating to the scope and application of the SRBA statutes in the courts ofldaho. The
Legislature had enacted statutes which implicated inter alia: 1. Expanding the SRBA Court's
jurisdiction to decree provisions controlling the administration of water rights by IDWR; and
2. Modifying the SRBA process with respect to costs and attorneys' fees, mandatory settlement
conferences, expert witness testimony, the admissibility of evidence and the legal weight to be
attributed to evidence.
The Supreme Court confirmed that the judicial branch has procedural rule-making
authority under the Idaho Constitution. The Court stated:
Article Five of the Idaho Constitution provides for and governs the
powers of the judicial branch of government. The section of that
Article governing the powers of the Legislature and the courts to
enact procedural rules provides:
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POWER OF LEGISLATURE RESPECTING COURTS. The
legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains
to it as a coordinate department of the government; but the
legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, and
regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in
the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the
Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done without
conflict with this Constitution, provided, however, that the
legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for any
crimes, and any sentence imposed shall be not less than the
mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory
sentence so imposed shall not be reduced.
Idaho Const. art. V, § 13.

In re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 253, 912 P.2d at 621. The Court also recognized that Article V,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution provided a shared power to enact "methods of proceeding"
in the district courts "when necessary," meaning "only where the 'method of proceeding' has not
otherwise been regulated, or where changing time has required further or different regulation,
then the legislature shall regulate such matters." Id., 128 Idaho at 254, 912 P.2d at 622.
Applying this authority, the Court ruled that the Legislature acted within its constitutional
authority by establishing procedures necessary to commence the SRBA. Id., 128 Idaho at 255,
912 P .2d at 623. The Court noted that water right adjudications present unique circumstances,
often requiring a departure from established rules of procedure, and that when the SRBA was
authorized by statute in 1986, no reasonable method of initiating the proceeding or providing
notice to potential claimants existed and "in light of the absence of applicable Rules of Civil
Procedure, it was necessary for the Legislature to provide special procedural rules for the
initiation of the SRBA." Id, 128 Idaho at 255, 912 P.2d at 623 (emphasis added). It must be
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emphasized that the ruling of the Court in this regard applied only to the initiation of the SRBA.
As discussed below, the Court also specifically found that Rule 55 applied in the SRBA to the
procedure for entry of default, such as a default judgment disallowing a water right.
In In re SRBA, the Court further ruled that the 1994 adjudication statutes were a proper
exercise of legislative authority to the extent those statutes prescribed substantive law or did not
conflict with the rules of the Court. Id., 128 Idaho 255, 912 P.2d at 623. The Court described the
distinction between the legislative power to enact substantive laws and the Court's rulemaking
power that governs procedure in the courts, as follows:
The Idaho Constitution vests the power to enact substantive laws in
the Legislature. Idaho Const. art. III, § 1; see also Mead v. Arnell,
117 Idaho 660,664, 791 P.2d 410,414 (1990) ("[O]fldaho's three
branches of government, only the legislature has the power to
make 'law."'). This power it not restricted by the Court's authority
to enact rules of procedure to be followed in the district courts.
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,863,828 P.2d 891,892 (1992)
("[T]his Court's rule making power goes to procedural, as opposed
to substantive, rules."). This Court has adopted the standard for
delineating substantive laws from procedural rules promulgated by
the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498,
527 P.2d 674 (1974). In Smith, the Washington Supreme Court
observed that substantive law "creates, defines, and regulates
primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the
essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated." Id. at 501,
527 P.2d at 677, quoted in Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d
at 892-93.
128 Idaho at 255, 912 P.2d at 623.
Applying this legal authority, the Court ruled that it was within the Legislature's power to
enact Idaho Code§ 42-1411(4)(1994), which provides that the Director's report "shall constitute
prima facie evidence of the nature and extent of the water rights acquired under state law." This
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was so because Idaho Rule of Evidence 301, which governs the treatment of presumptions in the
courts, expressly provides that statutory presumptions shall be given effect as provided in the
statute that creates the presumption. In effect, there was no conflict between the statute that
created the presumption and the evidentiary rule that applied it as a prima facie presumption
which may be rebutted by contrary evidence in the court proceedings.
With respect to the statutory prohibition against awards of costs and attorney fees against
the State in a general water adjudication, in Idaho Code§ 42-1423 (1994), the Court held it is a
legitimate exercise of the Legislature's substantive authority. "However, the Legislature's
removal of state agencies from potential liability for awards of costs and fees does not deprive
the district court of its inherent authority to assess sanctions for bad faith conduct against all
parties appearing before it." In Re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 256, 912 P.2d at 624. But, the Court also
held that the treatment afforded the IDWR Director as an "independent expert and technical
assistant" in the SRBA under Idaho Code§ 42-1401B(l) (1994) would be governed by the Idaho
Rules of Evidence which concern the treatment of expert witnesses in court proceedings, rather
then as provided in the statute, which would be of no effect. In Re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 258,
912 P.2d at 626.
Most germane to the District Court's refusal to apply I.R.C.P. 55 here, is this Court's
analysis ofldaho Code § 42-1411(4) (1994), which stated that provisions in the SRBA Director's
reports to which no objections are filed "shall be decreed as reported." This Court found this to
be in conflict with both the Rules of Civil Procedure and the constitutional authority of the courts
as a coordinate department of government. This Court stated:
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The requirement of LC.§ 42-1411(4) (1994) that provisions in the
Director's report to which no objections are filed "shall be decreed
as reported" is in conflict with both the Rules of Civil Procedure
and the constitutional authority of the courts as a coordinate
department of government. Under the 1986 statutory framework,
the district court was required to admit unobjected to portions of
the Director's report "as true facts." I.C. § 42-4212(9) (1986).
However, the provision in the 1994 statutes that the district court
shall decree the unobjected to portions of the Director's report as
those provisions are reported removes the authority of the courts to
apply the facts to the law and render a conclusion. The removal of
this authority contradicts the rules established by this Court for
entry of default judgment and divests the court of the power to
correct even an egregious error that might eliminate or impair
constitutionally recognized water rights. As this Court observed in
an early case involving the adjudication of water rights, "the
plaintiff, after taking default, must apply to the court for the relief
· demanded in the complaint; in other words, must establish by
proof the material allegations of his complaint." Joyce, 23 Idaho at
304, 130 P. at 796.
The procedure to be followed by the district court where no
objection has been raised is established by the mles for entering a
default judgment in civil actions, set out in I.R.C.P. 55 ....
Although a general water adjudication is a unique type of
proceeding, such an adjudication is nonetheless a suit within the
original jurisdiction of the district court, as conferred by Article V,
Section 20 of the Idaho Constitution. In Mays this court explained:
The district court has original jurisdiction in all cases, both at
law and in equity (Const., art. 5, sec. 20) "The legislature
shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any
power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government." (Const., art. 5, sec.
13.) One has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts
to protect his right to the use of water for irrigation ....
In Re SRBA, 128 Idaho at 258; 912 P.2d at 626 (emphases added).
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It is clear from the rulings of this Court in In Re SRBA, that the Legislature did not have
the authority to authorize the SRBA court to disregard LR.C.P. 55 and enter a default judgment
which deprived Edens of their right to the use of water for irrigation under 37-864 until the
IDWR complied with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and gave the Edens three days notice of
intent to take default. The District Court committed clear error when it ruled in the Order

Denying Motions that disallowal of an unclaimed water right in a general adjudication is not a
default judgment and that such disallowal is entered pursuant to, and by operation of, statute, and
that, therefore, compliance with I.R.C.P. 55 was unnecessary. Contrary to the decision of the
SRBA Court, compliance with LR.C.P. 55's default notice requirement was necessary and the
failure to do so is sufficient grounds to vacate the Order Denying Motions and to set aside the

Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right 37-864.
The State's argument in Respondent's Brief that personally serving the Edens with threedays notice would not have been practical because of the number of water rights that were
unclaimed is without merit and does not excuse the State of the obligation to serve the Rule 55
notice in this instance. See Respondent's Brief at 28. First, we are dealing here only with water
right 37-864 owned by Edens -no other water rights are at issue here; second, Rule 55(b)(2),
while limited to those who have appeared, does not qualify the obligation to serve the three-day
notice only if it is practicable to do so; and third, IDWR previously did not find it impracticable
to send a letter to the Edens to confirm their correct mailing address or to send a (mis-addressed)
letter to inform them that they needed to submit a formal claim and pay a fee. IDWR had the

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 22
48728.0001.9312581.3

Edens' correct address on file and easily could have put a notice in the mail to Edens that their
Water Right No. 37-864 was the object of a planned entry of default judgment.
The State also argues that Rule 55(b)(2) is not applicable to the Edens because it only
would require three-day notice to be given when a party appeared and the Edens had not
appeared with respect to 37-864. Respondent's Brief at 28-29. However, this position is
inconsistent with this Court's broad interpretation of what constitutes an "appearance" in this
context: "An appearance triggering the requirement of the three-day notice has been broadly
defined and conduct on the part of the defendant which indicates an intent to defend against the
action an appearance within the meaning of the rule." Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co. Inc.,
107 Idaho 602, 606, 691 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1984). The Edens became entitled to the protections
of Rule 55(b) when they submitted their documents to IDWR in an attempt to file a claim and
thereby put IDWR on notice that they intended to claim water right 37-864 in the SRBA. IDWR
acknowledged receipt of these documents and the Edens' attempted claim in the May I 9, 2005,
mis-addressed letter. R Vol. I, p. 229. In the SRBA, it is IDWR that typically accepts the water
right claims from water right holders and then evaluates them before reporting their
recommended elements in Director's reports filed with the SRBA Court. See Idaho Code

§ 42-1409(4). Thus, in the SRBA, the ordinary way to claim a water and to appear is through
IDWR, as the Edens did.
The State's argument that the scope of an acceptable appearance should be restricted to
the holding in Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,288,221 P.3d 81, 86 (2009) should be rejected.
In Meyers, the Court stated: "[T]he defendant's actions 'must be responsive to plaintiff's formal
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[c ]ourt action,' so it is insufficient to simply be interested in the dispute or to communicate to the
plaintiff an unwillingness to comply with the requested relief." But, Meyers was not an SRBA
case and does not involve a water right; it was an action against former Congressman Hansen to
collect an investment loss. In Meyers, a default was entered against Hansen and he was served
with the default judgment. The Meyers case is clearly distinguishable from the Edens's case. A
major difference between the "normal civil action" and the SRBA is the manner in which
claimants make an appearance in the SRBA case and are deemed to be "parties." A party who
seeks to submit a claim in the SRBA, files it with IDWR. Idaho Code§ 42-1409(4). The filing
of the claim makes one a party to the SRBA. Id The Edens' submission to IDWR with the
intent to submit a claim to 37-864, put IDWR on notice the Edens intended to claim water right
37-864 and amply constituted the Edens' appearance, under the broad definition enunciated in
Catledge. Under the circumstances of this case, the Edens appeared as owners of Water Right
No. 37-864 in the SRBA and were entitled to the three-day default notice under Rule 55(b).

D.

The Partial Decree of Disallowal, Entered in Default, Should Be Set Aside under
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), Because the Statutorily Required Second Round Service Notice,
Purportedly Sent Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4), Was Substantively
Defective, under the Facts of this Case, Since the Edens Sought the Assistance of
IDWR in Filing the Claim for Water Right No. 37-864, as the Purported Notice
States, and IDWR Responded to the Edens at an Incorrect Address, Different from
the Address the Edens Had Just Confirmed to IDWR, and, Therefore, the Edens
Never Received that IDWR Response Rejecting their Prior Claim.
In the third 60(b)(4) alternative basis for setting aside the default, the Edens assert that

the LC. 42-1408 Second Round Service Notice that IDWR purports to have sent to the Edens
was substantively defective under the facts of this case. Due to the defective Smith Affidavit that
IDWR filed with the SRBA Court in June 2005, the record does not establish the actual content
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of the Second Round Service Notice or whether the Edens actually received it. For the reasons
discussed above and in the Edens' opening brief, the record's lack of the statutorily required
proof of service (Idaho Code § 42-1408(5)) for the statutorily required Second Round Service
Notice (Idaho Code§ 42-1408(4)) is a separate and distinct procedurally based ground under
60(b)(4) for setting aside the default judgment for 37-864. In this independent third 60(b)(4)
ground for setting aside the default, the defective substance of the purported Second Round
Service Notice is the issue. Under this basis for relief, the Edens' position is that even if they
would have received the Second Round Service Notice that IDWR now purports to have sent,
that Notice would have been substantively defective, incorrectly, under the facts of this case,
instructing that, "Assistance in filing Notices of Claims may be obtained at all offices of IDWR"
and that "Notices of Claims must be filed on forms prepared by IDWR or a reasonable
facsimile." R Vol. I, p. 221 (emphases added). The May 19, 2005, mis-addressed IDWR letter
unequivocally confirms that the Edens had done exactly what the purported Second Round
Service Notice states to no avail: 1. Sought the assistance ofIDWR in claiming 37-864; and
2. Submitted documents to IDWR in an apparent attempt to claim 37-864: "I gathered from the
enclosures you sent me that you would like to file a claim on 37-864." R Vol. I, p. 229.
Because the IDWR assistance was mis-addressed and never received, the Edens never were
informed that IDWR had rejected their claim and they never received the follow up information
to submit an acceptable claim. R Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. Thus, in these respects, the purported
Second Round Service Notice would have contained incorrect information that led the Edens
astray in their effort to claim 37-864.
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It is fundamental that notice which provides mis-infom1ation cannot satisfy either
statutory notice requirements or due process as notice and an opportunity to be heard are
fundamental to procedural due process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S. Ct. 1983
(1972). "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950).
This may include an obligation, upon learning that an attempt at notice has failed, to take
"reasonable follow-up measures" that may be available. Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 235,
126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006) (state's certified letter, intended to notify a property owner that his
property would be sold unless he satisfied a tax delinquency, was returned by the post office
marked "unclaimed"; the state should have taken additional reasonable steps to notify the
property owner, as it would have been practicable for it to have done so.). The notice must be
sufficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed and what he must do to
prevent the deprivation of his interest. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68, 90 S. Ct. 1011
(1970). Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to assure that the person
to whom it is directed receives it. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 85 S. Ct. 1187 (1965);

Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 93 S. Ct. 30 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,
102 S. Ct. 1874 (1982).
Notice that is inadequate, incorrect or even ambiguous cannot satisfy due process. See,

e.g., Franck-Teel v State, 143 Idaho 664,672, 152 P.3d 25, 32 (Ct. App. 2006) (State failed to
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provide adequate notice of purported deficiencies in petition for post-conviction relief pursuant
to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) and district court failed to provide required notice allowing twentydays to respond before dismissing petition.); Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 129,
578 P.2d 244, 245 (1978) (district court failed to notify appellant of its intention to dismiss
application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Idaho Code§ l 9-4906(b)). Water rights, being
among the most important of property rights in Idaho, have, since the State's earliest days, been
deemed subject to strict due process protections. Bear Lake County v. Budge, 9 Idaho 703, 711,
75 P. 614,616 (1904). In Lu Ranching, the Court quoted from the decision in Bear Lake County,
'"reasonable service of summons is actual service upon all known defendants who reside in and
can be found in the county when the suit is brought."' Lu Ranching, 138 Idaho at 609,
. 67 P.3d at 88. Inherent in due process is satisfactory notice prior to judicial determinations
affecting rights to life, liberty or property. Id
Yet, Respondent's Brief does not squarely address the language in the purported Second

Round Service Notice and whether under the facts of the case, this language would have taken
the Edens down a wrong path and, therefore, have been fatally defective. Instead, without any
references to statutory or case law, the State focuses on whether the Edens had a reasonable
belief that they properly filed the claim, rather than the substantive adequacy of the purported

Notice. However, the proper matter under legal scrutiny here is the purported Notice itself and,
whether, under the facts of this case, the purported Notice's language would have been materially
misleading and, therefore, could not satisfy either statutory or due process notice requirements.
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When the language of the purported Second Round Service Notice is viewed in the
context of the facts and circumstances in this case, it is irrefutable that this language would have
taken the Edens down a wrong path, similar to the dead end path they actually did take. In the
May 19, 2005, mis-addressed letter, IDWR acknowledges the receipt of enclosures sent by the
Edens in their attempt to claim 37-864 in facsimile form, as the purported Notice states would be
acceptable. R Vol. I, p. 229. Then, with this same letter, IDWR attempts to provide the follow
up claim filing assistance that the purported Second Round Service Notice promises. R Vol. I,
p. 229. However, the Edens never received this mis-addressed follow up assistance, although the
Edens had recently provided IDWR written confirmation of their correct mailing address.
R Vol. I, pp. 231, 238-39. Thus, under the facts and circumstances presented here, the purported

Second Round Service Notice would have provided the Edens incorrect information about the
possible use of facsimile forms and IDWR's availability to offer assistance.
While there is no proof in the record to substantiate that the purported Second Round

Service Notice was sent to the Edens or actually received by them; it cannot be refuted that it
would have led the Edens in the wrong direction, if they had received it. The purported Second

Round Service Notice, if received, could have led the Edens to attempt to file a claim in facsimile
form and to seek IDWR assistance with it. Under the facts of this case, that road would have led
to a dead end, rather than claim filing success, with default being entered and invalidation of
their Water Right No. 37-864.
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E.

The Partial Decree of Disallowal, Entered in Default, Should Be Set Aside under
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), Because There Were "Unique and Compelling Circumstances,"
Including the Edens Confirming in Writing their Correct Mailing Address, and
IDWR, Nevertheless, Then Using an Incorrect Mailing Address to Provide the
Edens Information that their SRBA Claim for 37-864 Was Insufficient and Had
Been Rejected.
The State opposes the Edens' 60(b)(6) claim for relief: asserting that: (1) it is actually a

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) "mistake" claim; and (2) no "unique and compelling circumstances" justifying
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) are presented. Respondent's Brief at 31-32. The State's position
belies an incomplete understanding of the full nature of the Edens' 60(b)(6) claim. The State's
limiting characterization of the Edens' 60(b)(6) claim to be based solely on having "mistakenly
believed that they had filed a claim in the SRBA" does not take account of the full panoply of
"unique and compelling circumstances" actually presented in this case:
1. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that the Edens'
attempted to claim 37-864 and that IDWR unequivocally
acknowledged this in its May 19, 2005, letter. R Vol. I, p. 229.
2. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that IDWR
cannot identify the documents that the Edens submitted to IDWR
in their attempt to claim 37-864.
3. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that the Edens
promptly confirmed in writing their correct mailing address, as
requested by IDWR. R Vol. I, p. 214.
4. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that despite
having just received mailing address confirmation from the Edens,
nevertheless IDWR used an incorrect mailing address to inform
the Edens their attempted claim had been rejected and to provide
follow up instructions. R Vol. I, p. 229.
5. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that it was not
until 2015, over six months after entry of the SRBA Final Unified
Decree, that the Edens first received personal notice that 37-864
had been decreed in default and that it may no longer be delivered
by the watermaster. R Vol. I, p. 356.
6. It does not take account of the uncontroverted fact that no one
other than the State has opposed the Edens, although the major

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 29
48728.0001.9312581.3

stakeholders in the SRBA and/or their representatives have
received personal service of the Edens' Motion to Set Aside Final
Unified Decree and Disallowal Order with respect to 37-864 ..
R Vol. I, pp. 259-274.
7. It does not take into account the Waterrnaster's uncontroverted
factual assertion that, "In view of the long term existence of
37-864, I would not anticipate prejudice to other existing water
users if it were reinstated." R Vol. I, p. 282.
8. It does not take into account that 37-864 is a well established
senior previously decreed water right, and Idaho law disfavors its
forfeiture. R Vol. I, p. 254-55.
To describe this case as simply involving "a mistaken belief that a claim had been filed,"
as the State does, ignores the totality of the circumstances that conspired to thwart the Edens'
good faith attempt to claim 37-864 and the true nature of the overall situation militating in favor
of granting the Edens relief under 60(b)(6).
There are not many cases in Idaho addressing the question, so what constitutes "unique
and compelling circumstances" under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). In an early case under prior law, the
Idaho Court upheld vacating a default judgment where the judge had sent a telegram to the
attorneys for the defendant intervenor informing them that the cause would be set for hearing on
"Tuesday next," but an error occurred in the transmission of said telegram, whereby the same
was made to read, "Thurn, against Pyke will be set for Thursday day next." When the defendant
intervenor failed to appear on the actual hearing date, a default judgment was entered. The Court,
on motion to vacate the judgment, ruled that the intervenor was prevented from having a hearing
in the case through no fault of his own and was entitled to relief from the judgment. Thum v.
Pyke, 6 Idaho 359, 362-63, 55 P. 864, 865-66 (1898). See also, Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,

579,212 P.3d 1001, 1009 (2009) (reversed district court and granted Rule 60(b)(6) relief on
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behalf of a minor child where the parents and attorney failed to prosecute meritorious personal
injury claims of minor child).
In Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375,234 P.3d (2010), the district court
in Teton County entered a default judgment against Dawson quieting a one-fourth interest in real
estate to Bach. The relief granted by the district court in the judgment was inconsistent with the
relief sought by Bach in his complaint. Dawson filed a motion to reconsider and an LR.C.P.
60(b)(6) motion to set aside the judgment on the basis that the judgment was directly contrary to
a default judgment that had been previously entered by a different judge of the district court in
Teton County. Dawson asserted that he had a meritorious defense because he was not aware of
the lawsuit in which the default judgment was entered until he received a phone call explaining
that the default judgment had been entered. In response to the motion to set aside the judgment,
the district court held that Dawson's lack of knowledge of the underlying lawsuit was not
grounds to grant the motion for reconsideration, but, instead, served as grounds for an
independent action. The district court did not rule on Dawson's Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Dawson
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court arguing that the district court erred by failing to rule on the
60(b)( 6) motion, and by denying the motion for reconsideration and other grounds. The Supreme
Court held that the district court erred by failing to issue a ruling on Dawson's Rule 60(b)(6)
motion. In its decision the Supreme Court stated that the facts of the case "may constitute unique
and compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under LR.C.P. 60(b)(6)." 149 Idaho
at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. In its decision, the Court stated:
Under I.R.C. P. 60(b)(6), a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for "any ... reason justifying relief
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from the operation of the judgment." Idaho R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
"[A]lthough the court is vested with broad discretion in
determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its
discretion is limited and [the motion] may be granted only on a
showing of 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying
relief. (citations omitted)
The district court erred by failing to issue a ruling on Dawson's
Rule 60(b)(6) motion. (citations omitted) ...
Additionally, the facts of this case may constitute unique and
compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). First and foremost, the relief granted by the
district court in the September 11, 2007, opinion and quiet-title
judgment, and the subsequent First Amended judgment, is
inconsistent with the relief sought by Bach in his March 26, 2002,
complaint in intervention. The district court is not authorized to
grant relief that is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence in
the case. (citation omitted) ... Therefore , the discrepancy between
Bach's complaint and the remedy ordered by the district court may
be a unique and compelling circumstance upon which relief under
a Rule 60(b )(6) motion may be justified.
149 Idaho at 381,234 P.3d 706. The Court further explained that the district court had been
misled with respect to the holding in the earlier Teton County judgment by the party who moved
for entry of the default judgment and that because the misrepresentation served as the foundation
for the district court's quiet-title judgment and first amended judgment, "sufficiently unique and
compelling circumstances likely exist for the district court to grant Dawson's Rule 60(b)(6)
motion to vacate the judgment and amended judgment." Id.
In Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d 589 (2011 ), the Court upheld the district
court decision to vacate a default judgment under circumstances somewhat similar to those in the
Edens' case. Maynard sued for damages for breach of a lease; Nguyen failed to appear at the
hearing and a default judgment was entered in favor of Maynard. Subsequently, Nguyen moved
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to set aside the default judgment which was granted. Maynard appealed. The facts reveal that
after being served with the complaint, Nguyen wrote a letter to the ''Honorable Judge, Mr.
Eppink [counsel for Maynard], Janice Maynard and To Whom it May Concern" in which
Nguyen asserted and explained a meritorious defense to the claims of Maynard. The letter
reached Eppink and Maynard, but not the judge. At the evidentiary hearing on damages, Eppink
told the judge he had received a letter with various documents attached which was addressed to
the judge and asked if it had been received. When the judge said it had not been received, Eppink
offered no further information and presented evidence concerning damages. The district court
granted a default judgment. With their Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the Nguyens noted they had sent
Maynard's attorney the letter explaining their version of events and why they thought they had a
meritorious defense. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho at 724-25, 274 P.3d at 590-91.
The district court granted the motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that the
Nguyens had demonstrated there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) because Maynard's attorney had failed to comply with Idaho Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.3 and this lapse had resulted in prejudice to the Nguyens. The Court
found that the letter sent by the Nguyens had asserted and explained a meritorious defense. On
appeal, Maynard contended that the Nguyens never raised the issue of attorney misconduct in the
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) motion, and that the district court exceeded its discretion in considering that
ground. Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho at 725; 274 P.3d at 591. In its decision upholding the
District Court decision to vacate the judgment, the Court stated:
The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
unique and compelling circumstances justified the relief it granted
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to the Nguyens. The district court acted within its discretion in
concluding that Maynard's counsel should have provided it with
the letter and attached Three Days Notice at the default hearing
because it did outline a meritorious defense. It was directed to the
judge, and it obviously had a bearing on the judgment's outlook
with regard to the case. As Maynard points out in her opening
brief, Rule 3.3(d) of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct
provides, "In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the
tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer, that will enable
the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts
are adverse." She continued, "Maynard and her counsel
acknowledge, of course, that the existence of the letter was
material to the default hearing, as was the letter's salutation -to
'The Honorable Judge."' [emphasis in original]. When he learned
of the content of the letter at a later date, the district judge
obviously concluded that it contained information material to the
issue at hand in the default hearing. While Maynard's counsel
orally notified the judge of the letter at the hearing, there was no
mention of the attached Three Days Notice, nor of the indication in
the letter that the N guyens were intent on defending against
Maynard's claim ....
152 Idaho at 730; 274 P.3d 595.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) is similar to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) and both are
intended to "accomplishjustice":
The leading case to construe [federal] Rule 60(b)(60 as providing
a basis for relief from a judgment is Klapprott v. United States,
335 U.S. 601, 93 L. Ed. 266, 69 S. Ct. 384 (1949), in which Mr.
Justice Black stated: "In simple English, the language of the 'other
reason' clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified,
vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments
whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice .... '
[T]he federal courts have generally applied clause ( 6) liberally
whenever modification or vacation of a judgment appeared
appropriate to accomplish justice ....

Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Authorizing
Relieffi·om Final Judgment or Order for "Any other Reason," 15 A.L.R. Fed. 193, at 32 (1973).
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Denying the Edens the relief they seek pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) under the "unique and
compelling circumstances" of this case would be an injustice; however, granting the Edens relief
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) would accomplish justice.
F.

The District Court Improperly Denied the Edens' Motion to Filr Late Notice of
Claim on the Basis that their Motion to Set Aside the Partial Decree of Disallowal
Had Been Denied.
The State acknowledges that if any of the 60(b) grounds are granted, the next step would

be for the Edens' Motion to File Late Notice of Claim to be considered. Respondent's Brief at
35. Typically, such Motions to File Late Notice of Claim are evaluated in the SRBA pursuant to
the good cause standard ofIRCP 55(c). See SRBA Administrative Order l; Rules of Procedure

(AOJ), Rule 4(d)(2)(d); R Vol. Ip. 883. The State raises three reasons for opposing the Edens'
Motion to File Late Claim: 1. prejudice; 2. finality; and 3. claim processing time. Respondent's

Brief at 35-36. Each of these are addressed below.
Appellants' Brief explained that the prior 1918 Decree for Water Right No. 37-864 and
the Edens' Deed for the water right's place of use established that the Edens have alleged a
detailed meritorious case with respect to their claim to Water Right No. 37-864. Appellants'

Brief at 31-32. The Edens also addressed the issue of prejudice in Appellants' Brief but the State
in its brief nevertheless asserts that the water shortage in Basin 37 and the associated moratorium
on new consumptive rights in that Basin would "prejudice junior water users by reducing the
amount of legally available water and by allowing a new senior to assert priority." Respondent's

Brief at 35. It appears that the "new senior" the State refers to here is intended to mean Water
Right No. 37-864. But, actually, 37-864 is not a "new senior," that would be "newly" inserted
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into the delivery hierarchy of water rights; but a senior (1896) water right that the record
establishes was delivered up to 2015, after the entry of the SRBA Final Unified Decree on
August 25, 2014. R Vol. I, p. 356.
The State reiterates its concern for finality, but its concern for "finality" actually appears
to be the same as its concern for prejudice. The State suggests, without providing any specific
factual support, that allowing the claim for 37-864 to proceed :µow would somehow have broad
impacts to other water rights in the same water system. Respondent's Brief at 32-33. Actually,
the factual record establishes the opposite: that Water Right No. 37-864 was delivered up to
2015 and that a permanent cessation of this 1896 water right which was decreed in 1918 for use
on this same property is more likely to upset the apple cart than 37-864's continued delivery and
use in accordance with historic practices. R Vol. I, pp. 281-82. Since Basin 37 has a moratorium
in place and, therefore, is closed to new consumptive water rights, as the State has noted, there
also should be no new junior water users that could be impacted by a resumption in the delivery
of 37-864 which only ceased to be delivered in 2015. R Vol. I, p. 356. Indeed, the record
reflects that even the Watermaster, the IDWR employee in the best position to know, does not
anticipate any prejudice as a result of delivery of 37-864: "Typically, water right no. 37-864 is
delivered during the first part of the irrigation season. Then, it is the practice for supplemental
storage water from American Falls Reservoir District #2 to be delivered to the place of use. In
view of the long term existence of 37-864, I would not anticipate prejudice to other existing
water users if it were reinstated." Affidavit of Kevin Lakey, R Vol. I, pp. 281-82. Further, setting
aside the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect to Water Right No. 37-864
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need not affect the "finality" of the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified Decree with respect
to other water rights. The void or voidable parts of the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified
Decree relating to 37-864 can be separated from the other parts, and such parts can be vacated,
leaving other water rights unaffected. See, e.g., Backman v. Douglas, 46 Idaho 671, 677,
270 P. 618,619 (1928).
While raising a possibly "lengthy" claim processing time as another obstacle to granting
the Edens' relief, the State actually fails to identify the anticipated timeframe or specifically
explain why this timeframe should preclude granting the Edens relief. Respondent's Brief at 36.
Nevertheless, in quoting the portion of the District's Judge's Order Denying Motions describing
the late claim process, the State implicitly acknowledges that there is an available process for
addressing a late claim, such as one for 37-864, in the SRBA:
A motion to file a late claim must generally comply with docket
sheet notice procedure. If granted, the Department must
investigate the claim and file a director's report and provide a
period of time for objection and responses. If the Department's
recommendation is contested the process can take much longer.
Respondent's Brief at 36, quoting Order Denying Motions, R Vol. I, p. 382. In fact, the record
reflects that the SRBA Court continues to process late claims, issuing a decree for one as
recently as November 2016. R Vol. I, pp. 1203, 1215 (Water Right/Subcase No. 63-34203).
None of the three bases the State raises for denying the Edens' ]vfotion to File Late Claim
are sufficient: No prejudice to other water users is reflected in the record; rather, the record
reflects that other water users are more likely to be affected by 37-864's cessation than its
continued diversion in accordance with historic practices. The record, including the
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watermaster' s affidavit, actually supports the prevention of any prejudice by maintaining the
historic status quo and reinstating 37-864. Also, the State points to no concrete information in
the record supporting its assertion that the SRBA late claim process would be unduly "lengthy."
Rather, the record reflects that the SRBA Court has a late claim process in place, a process which
it continues to use. Quite simply, the State identifies no legitimate reason for denying the Edens'
Motion to File Late Claim.

G.

The State is Not Entitled to Attorneys Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121.
The State claims that it is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121.

Respondent's Brief at 36. The State's claim is unsupported by the facts and the law relating to

this case.
Finding that the Edens "have presented the court with legitimate questions for the court
address," the District Court in this case denied the State's 12-121 claim for attorney fees below:
The Idaho Supreme Court has held with respect to Idaho Code
§ 12-121 that "[i]n normal circumstances, attorney fees will only
be awarded when this court is left with the abiding belief that the
appeal was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably
or without foundation." Reed v. Reed, 160 Idaho 774, 780,
379 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2016). In this case, the Movants have
presented the court with legitimate questions for the Court to
address. The Court does not find the issue of whether the Court
Documents should be set aside under the facts and circumstances
presented here to be frivolous or without foundation. Therefore,
the Court in an exercise of its discretion declines to award attorney
fees to the State in this proceeding.
Order Denying Motions at 7-8; R Vol. I, pp. 381-82.

This same rationale should be applied by the Supreme Court to deny the State's claim for
attorney fees on appeal. The State is not entitled to an award of fees under Idaho Code § 12-121,
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which provides for attorneys fees awards only when a case "was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation":
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's
fees to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation. This section shall not alter,
repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides for the
award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is
defined to include any person, partnership, corporation,
association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
Idaho Code§ 12-121 (amended March 1, 2017). Rule 54(e)(2) similarly limits the power of the
court to award attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121. Rule 54(e)(2) provides:
Pursuant to the statutory amendment effective March 1, 2017,
attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by
the court only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, which
finding must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the
award. No attorney fees may be awarded pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-121 on a default judgment.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(2) (2017).
This Appeal does not present a situation that can be characterized as a case that is brought
or pursued "frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." This Court is not being "simply
invited ... to re-weigh the evidence presented to the district court" as was the situation in Doble

v. Interstate Amusements, Inc., 160 Idaho 307,372 P.3d 362 (2016), cert denied,_ U.S.
137 S.Ct. 343, 196 L.Ed.2d 263 (2016). The Edens' case presents evidence that existing Idaho
law was violated and presents good faith arguments for the application and/or the extension of
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Idaho law to vacate the Order Denying Motions, the Disallowal Order and the Final Unified
Decree with respect to Water Right No. 37-864.

This case also is not frivolous or without foundation because it contains legitimate issues
of first impression. A claim is not necessarily frivolous simply because the District Court
concluded it fails as a matter of law and the Appellants are presenting arguments that were made
before the District Court, as the State asserts. See Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468,
259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011) ("[t]he question is whether the position adopted was not only incorrect,
but so plainly fallacious that is could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation."); Elliott v. Verska, 152 Idaho 280,291,271 P.3d 678,689 (2012) (holding appeal
was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation because the issue had not been
considered previously by the Court); Hammer v. City of Sun Valley, No. 43079-2015,
2016 Westlaw 7384133 at 10 (Idaho Dec. 21, 2016) (denied award of attorney fees under 12-121
because the issue was previously unsettled; it was a case of first impression).
Most persuasive is language of the Court in the case of Phillips v. Balzier-Henry,
154 Idaho 724,731,302 P.3d 349,356 (2013), where the Court said: "[w]hen deciding
whether attorney fees should be awarded under LC. § 12-121, the entire course of the
litigation must be taken into account; and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented,
attorney fees may not be awarded, even though the losing party has asserted other factual or
legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." 154 Idaho at 731,
302 P.3d at 356. The Edens' appeal raises numerous legitimate issues of first impression.
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Thus, the appeal cannot be considered to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation
and the State is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121.

II.

CONCLUSION

For each of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Order Denying

Motions should be reversed and the matter remanded with instructions to allow the Edens to file
a Late Notice of Claim for Water Right No. 37-864.

DATED THIS 25th day of August, 2017.

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By -A:-,,~,c______:_-t.-L..l.-- ~~~f--"""~'I.£-=-~ - ·
Dana L. Hofstetter,
Attorneys for Appellants ary and Glenna Eden
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ADDENDUM
Beaupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 710 P.2d 520 (1985), involved an award of punitive

damages to the plaintiff, Beaupre. Beaupre cross-appealed, claiming the award of punitive
damages was insufficient and argued on appeal that the instructions on punitive damages that
were given to the jury were erroneous because they did not comport with new standards that had
been established in Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700,682 P.2d 1247 (1983) and Cheney v.
Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897,905,665 P.2d 661,669 (1983). The Supreme Court

refused to consider Beaupre's argument stating, "[a]lthough Umphrey and Cheney both predated
the trial of this case, those cases were apparently not called to the attention of the trial court, nor
are the new standards established by those cases argued as a basis for evaluating the jury
instruction challenged on this appeal. Therefore, we will not consider Beaupre's assertions of
error on cross-appeal." Beaupre, 109 Idaho at 614, 710 P.2d at 524.
Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, 99 Idaho 793, 589 P.2d 540 (1979), involved an action

to quiet title to land near Whitebird, Idaho. On appeal, appellants maintained they had
established title to the disputed property by adverse possession. However, the district court stated
in its memorandum opinion that the appellants had not alleged title on the theory of adverse
possession and had objected at trial to testimony concerning adverse possession because they
were not claiming title by adverse possession. The Supreme Court rejected the new theory
stating: "Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and that parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court. Dunn v. Baugh,
95 Idaho 236,506 P.2d 463 (1973); Willows v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 337,461 P.2d 120
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(1969); Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439,444 P.2d 132 (1968); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,
437 P.2d 32 (1968). This issue was not argued below and is therefore not before this court on
appeal." Heckman Ranches, Inc., 99 Idaho at 799, 589 P.2d at 546-47.
Dunn v. Baugh, 95 Idaho 236,506 P.2d 463 (1973), was an action for dissolution of a

partnership and an accounting. On appeal, Dunn asserted for the first time that the trial court
erred in failing to hold the defendant had breached a fiduciary obligation to Dunn. This issue had
never been raised in the trial court. The Supreme Court rejected the issue stating: "Issues not
presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal. Williams v. Havens, 92 Idaho 439,
444 P.2d 132 (1968); Fraiser v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,437 P.2d 32 (1968); Swaringen v.
Swanstrom, 67 Idaho 245, 175 P.2d 692 (1946)." Dunn, 95 Idaho at 237-38; 506 P.2d at 464-65 ..
Willows v. City of Lewiston, 93 Idaho 33 7, 461 P .2d 120 ( 1969), was a case where

residents of Lewiston Orchards (an area on the bench above and adjacent to the City of
Lewiston) sued to enjoin the City from annexing the Orchards. One of the issues was whether
owners of burial lots in an Orchards cemetery were "land owners" who had the right to vote for
or against the annexation. The trial court apparently ruled on some additional issues that were
not properly presented to the trial court, so the Supreme Court refused to consider these
additional issues, stating: "Appellants have assigned as errors the court's decision on each of
these additional issues, but since such issues were not properly presented to the trial court, they
will not be considered on appeal." Willows, 93 Idaho at 340-41, 461 P.2d at 123-24.
Williams v. Haven, 921 Idaho 439,444 P.2d 132 (1968), was a case where the seller of

real estate on an installment contract sued to foreclose and forfeit the buyers' rights in the
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contract and property. In their original pleadings, the defendant asserted as part of their answer
and counterclaim that Plaintiff had been charging them excessive interest on the installments, but
they never pursued the claim in the trial court. On appeal from the trial court decision granting
the foreclosure, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff demanded excessive interest and tried to
raise the issue of usury. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, stating that it did not consider
the original pleading sufficient to raise the issue of usury; that the allegation of "excessive
interest," standing alone, does not allege usury. Further, the Court said that it would not consider
on appeal issues not originally raised in the trial court, citing Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho
504, 427 P.2d 278 (1967); Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179, 397 P.2d 761 (1964); Miller v. Miller,
88 Idaho 57,396 P.2d 476 (1964); and Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138,383 P.2d 844 (1963).
Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho 79,437 P.2d 32 (1968), was an action to enforce an
agreement by a lawyer to pay a client for damages resulting from the failure of the lawyer to
properly probate an estate in lieu of an action for malpractice against the lawyer. The case went
to a jury who held for the client and the lawyer appealed. On appeal, the lawyer tried to raise
new grounds to support a claim that the judgment was invalid. The Supreme Court rejected the
new issues stating, "We have held generally that this court will not review issues not presented in
the trial court, and that parties will be held to the theory on which the case was tried. Christensen
v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504,427 P.2d 278 (1967), and cases there cited. Here we are not dealing
with a question merely of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment. In this case
defendant did not plead failure of plaintiff to present her claim to the estate. I.R.C.P. Rule 8(c).
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The issue was neither presented to, nor tried nor determined by, the trial court." Frasier, 92
Idaho at 82; 437 P.2d at 35.
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504, 427 P.2d 278 (1967), was an action for personal

injuries suffered by plaintiff. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. At the close of the
plaintiffs evidence, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to support the verdict, which was denied. Defendant then produced evidence, but did
not renew his motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. Defendant moved for
a JNOV which was denied. Defendant appealed asserting that the trial court erred when it denied
the JNOV. The Supreme Court ruled that when defendant failed to renew the motion for directed
verdict at the close of all the evidence, he foreclosed the trial court from considering a JNOV
because under I.R.C.P. 50(b), it was a prerequisite for consideration of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict that a prior motion for directed verdict be made and denied. For that
same reason the appellate court held it was precluded from reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal. Christensen, 91 Idaho at 507,427 P.2d at 281.
Cantlin v. Carter, 88 Idaho 179,397 P.2d 761 (1964), involved an application to

appropriate water in Idaho. The State Reclamation Engineer denied the application when certain
protestants objected, asserting that they had prior rights to the water. The applicant appealed the
decision to the district court which held that there was no public water available for
appropriation. The applicant then appealed to the Supreme Court asserting various theories why
the application should be granted. The appellate court held that the evidence supported the
finding of the district court that there was no public water subject to appropriation and no error
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was made in entering the conclusions oflaw and judgment based on this finding. The appellate
court rejected the other theories stating: "It is fundamental that issues not raised in the trial court
will not be considered by this court on appeal and the parties will be held to the theory upon
which the cause was tried in the lower court. Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 383 P.2d 844."
Cantlin, 88 Idaho at 184, 397 P.2d at 764.
Miller v. Miller, 88 Idaho 57,396 P.2d 476 (1964), was an action to enforce a contract
between divorcing spouses. The trial court upheld the contract and the husband appealed,
asserting theories that were not raised in the trial court. The Supreme court held that the court
would not consider the husband's new theories because they were not presented to the trial court
by the pleadings or the evidence, citing Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,373 P.2d 929 (1962); and
Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138, 383 P.2d 844 (1963).
Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,373 P.2d 929 (1962), was an action between adjoining land
owners over a road. Respondents sought an injunction to stop appellant from using a road and
allowing his cattle to trespass on their property. Appellant counterclaimed alleging the road was
a public road. The trial court ruled the road was not public and enjoined the parties from
allowing their cattle to trespass. On appeal, appellant asserted twenty-three assignments of e1Tor.
The appeal court ruled it would not consider assignments of error that were unsupported by
citation or argument The appellate court ruled the evidence supported the judgment of the trial
court. Cox, 84 Idaho at 517,373 P.2d at 930.
Robinson v. Spicer, 86 Idaho 138,383 P.2d 844 (1963), was an action to rescind a
contract for the purchase of real estate, alleging that the vendor committed fraud in the sale. At
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the close of the buyer's evidence, the buyer informed the court that the buyer was electing to
proceed under the theory of rescission instead of a damage theory. The trial court, sitting without
a jury, ruled in favor of the seller and denied the buyer's claim for rescission. The appellate comi
found that the trial court's findings were supported by the evidence. Appellants also asserted
that the trial court erred in failing to reopen the trial to admit new evidence on a claim for
damages. The appellate court held that where appellants voluntarily elected in the trial court to
seek relief under the theory of rescission rather than damages, they waived any claim for
damages, stating: "It is the established rule in this jurisdiction that issues not raised in the trial
court cannot be presented to this Court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon
which the cause was tried in the lower court. (Citations omitted.)" Robinson, 86 Idaho at 145,
383 P.2d at 848.
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